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لابیگری شرکت، دیدگاه و محافظهکاری حسابداری | ||
دانش حسابداری و حسابرسی مدیریت | ||
مقاله 6، دوره 7، شماره 28، زمستان 1397، صفحه 75-92 اصل مقاله (951 K) | ||
نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
نویسندگان | ||
محمود لاری دشت بیاض![]() ![]() | ||
1استادیار گروه حسابداری، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران | ||
2کارشناسی ارشد حسابداری، موسسه آموزش عالی حکیم نظامی قوچان، قوچان، ایران(نویسنده مسئول) | ||
3استادیار گروه حسابداری، موسسه آموزش عالی حکیم نظامی قوچان، قوچان، ایران | ||
چکیده | ||
هدف این پژوهش بررسی رابطه بین لابیگری شرکت و محافظهکاری است. همچنین بررسی میشود که چگونه دیدگاه (دیدگاه عمومی) شرکت ارتباط بین فعالیتهای لابی شرکت و محافظهکاری حسابداری را شکل میدهد. در این راستا از اطلاعات بهدستآمده از 256 شرکت پذیرفتهشده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران بین سالهای 1386 تا 1395 استفاده شد. این تحقیق ازلحاظ هدف، از نوع تحقیقهای کاربردی و ازنظر ماهیت و روش از نوع توصیفی- همبستگی است و در آن از مدل رگرسیون (لجستیک، او. ال. اس) و آزمون علیت برای تجزیهوتحلیل دادهها و آزمون فرضیههای مطرحشده استفادهشده است. نتایج پژوهش نشان داد که بین لابیگری شرکت و محافظهکاری حسابداری رابطه مثبت معناداری وجود دارد. همچنین برای شرکتهای دارای دیدگاه عمومی بیشتر نیز رابطه معنادار است. شرکتهای لابیگری با سطوح دید (دیدگاه) بالا، محافظهکاری بیشتری دارند. شرکتهای دارای لابی بالاتر، سطوح بالاتری از محافظهکاری مشروط را نشان میدهند. بین شدت لابی و محافظهکاری غیر مشروط حسابداری، رابطه منفی معناداری وجود دارد. افزایش درشدت لابی از سوی شرکت، افزایشهای بعدی در محافظهکاری حسابداری را پیشبینی میکند. بااینحال، افزایش در محافظهکاری حسابداری شرکت، افزایش درشدت لابی را نشان نمیدهد. بروز لابیگری با محافظهکاری حسابداری شرکت در سال بعد رابطه معناداری دارد، اما با محافظهکاری حسابداری شرکت در قبل، رابطه معناداری ندارد. | ||
کلیدواژهها | ||
لابیگری شرکت؛ محافظهکاری مشروط؛ دیدگاه عمومی؛ ارتباط سیاسی | ||
مراجع | ||
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